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SIXTY-FIVE ORAL ARGUMENTS WERE NOT
ENOUGH: A TRIBUTE TO JUSTICE STEVENS
FROM ACROSS THE BENCH
Carter G. Phillips *
I first heard the name John Paul Stevens in 1975. I had just finished my
first year as a law student at Northwestern Law School and was working on
a master’s degree in political science as part of a joint-degree program when
President Ford announced then-Judge Stevens’s nomination to the Supreme
Court. Like everyone at the Law School, I was excited that a Northwestern
Law alumnus was going to be elevated to the Supreme Court, but candidly,
I never expected his presence there to have much of an impact on my
professional life. Although the focus in this Essay will be the relationship
between the Justice and me that developed over decades while he sat on the
Supreme Court, and I stood at the podium or sat at counsel table during oral
arguments, I have a couple of memories about the Justice that provide
context for my deep admiration of him.
After his confirmation to the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens began
hiring Northwestern Law alumni as his law clerks. He hired one each from
the two graduating classes ahead of mine, and both of them had clerked for
the same judge for whom I clerked after I graduated, Judge Robert A.
Sprecher. The Judge and Justice Stevens had been very close friends during
their tenure together on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit before Justice Stevens was “promoted.” It was because of Justice
Stevens’s presence on the Supreme Court and apparent willingness to
consider Northwestern students as possible clerks that I decided to apply for
a clerkship. A clerkship on the Court no longer seemed like a fantasy.
As it happened, Justice Stevens did not even interview me. For the 1978
Term, the Justice decided to reduce the number of law clerks in his Chambers
to two (he was entitled to four and in his first three years on the Court had
hired only three), and he had hired the Presidents of the Harvard and Stanford
Law Reviews, before I had even sent in my application. When I interviewed
the Justice after he retired at a public event at the Law School in 2016, he
asked me why I had not applied to clerk for him. I told him that I had. He
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very kindly commented that not giving me a chance was one of the many
mistakes he had made during his time on the Court. In truth, he did not make
a mistake; he had two outstanding clerks that Term. But even though I did
not get the clerkship I thought was my best opportunity, I had the good
fortune to be hired to clerk for Chief Justice Warren Burger that Term.
Without Justice Stevens, I am not certain that would have happened.
Law clerks typically have a lot of interaction with their own Justice, but
they tend to have quite limited contact with the others. My experience with
Justice Stevens was, however, a bit unusual. One day I was in his law clerks’
office talking about some case when the Justice walked in unexpectedly. I
apologized and started to make my way out, when Justice Stevens said: “No,
stay. I value your input as much as anyone else’s.” I doubt that was
completely true, but it was very kind, and I did stick around and offered my
two cents about whatever case he drifted in to discuss. I believe he was the
rare Justice who engaged freely and happily with any law clerk.
Even more remarkably, when Justice Stevens learned that my co-clerk,
Chris Walsh, and I were considering returning to Chicago to practice law
after our clerkships, he reached out and invited us to join him for lunch to
talk about practicing law with private firms in Chicago. To be sure, it was
not an elegant setting; we met with him in the cafeteria in the basement of
the Supreme Court (twice). Not surprisingly, he had very high praise about
his law firm, Rothschild, Barry & Myers, which he had cofounded. Chris, in
fact, went there after his clerkship. The Justice also had nothing but
compliments for the lawyers at Sidley & Austin, where I had summered and
where I would end up five years later (albeit in the Washington, D.C. office).
I came away with two special memories from those lunches. The first
was how overwhelmed and appreciative I felt that the Justice would spend
as much time as he did with us in order to give us candid and valuable advice
about becoming practicing lawyers, particularly in Chicago. The second was
how shocked I was that the three of us could sit in a public eating area
surrounded by Court visitors without anyone seeming to recognize that the
Justice was sitting among them. By contrast, my co-clerks and I went to the
same cafeteria with the Chief Justice on one occasion and spent ninety
percent of the time being introduced to visitors who came up to the table to
say hello to the Chief and ask if they could take his picture. And that was
long before the days of iPhone cameras and selfies.
Instead of going back to Chicago after my clerkship, however, I went
to the University of Illinois to teach law and then joined the Solicitor
General’s Office in 1981. I argued my first case in front of Justice Stevens
in January 1982, which was Justice O’Connor’s first Term on the bench,
meaning that Justice Stevens was no longer the junior Justice on the Court.
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That case was McElroy v. United States. 1 It involved the question of whether
a criminal statute that outlaws transporting forged securities in interstate
commerce was violated by the defendant presenting a check obtained in Ohio
to a merchant in Pennsylvania without proof that the forgery itself had taken
place before the check was transported across state lines. 2
The case is largely forgettable but for the fact that the opinion for the
Court was written by Justice O’Connor and was one of her first two or three
opinions as a Supreme Court Justice. Justice Stevens wrote a solo dissent, a
not uncommon occurrence, which meant that the United States prevailed by
an 8–1 vote. What was particularly memorable about the argument were the
questions from Justice White and Justice Stevens. Because the check in the
case undeniably was carried across state lines, I focused on that fact to
demonstrate that the interstate commerce requirement had been satisfied.
Justice White wanted to know whether it made any difference that the check
itself moved across the border as long as the defendant did so in the process
of trying to avoid having his forgery detected. 3
It was never clear to me whether Justice White was simply giving a
rookie advocate a hard time or not, but it quickly became obvious that Justice
White’s questioning triggered genuine concern in Justice Stevens who
followed up with one of his famous hypotheticals:
Suppose you have the same facts you have here, except as Justice White
suggests, the theft was from Pittsburgh, but yet he lived in Ohio, and he called
up from the Ohio Turnpike to Beaver Falls and said, I am on my way in, I am
going to pick up the check in Pittsburgh and deliver it to you. He did exactly
that, but it was a forged check. Wasn’t that exactly like this case? 4

I said no, because in our case the check in fact had moved across state lines,
which made it a much easier case. But what became clear to me was that
Justice White (along with the rest of the Court) was comfortable with the
idea that the check did not need to cross state lines to violate the statute, and
he simply wanted me to embrace that theory of the case. By contrast, Justice
Stevens found that idea very troubling and even wondered what the federal
interest would be if the check itself never made it out of Pennsylvania as in
his hypothetical. 5 In some ways, his question anticipated the Court’s later
decisions limiting Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. 6 That
1

455 U.S. 642 (1982).
Id. at 643.
3 Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642 (1982) (No. 80-6680).
4 Id. at 25–26.
5 Id. at 30.
6 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 598 (2000) (holding that Congress did not have
constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause to create a private right of action in the Violence
2
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the oral argument influenced the Justice’s vote is made plain in his dissent
where he argued: “Under the Court’s analysis, petitioner would have violated
§ 2314 if he had left his home in Ohio, picked up a forged check in
Pittsburgh, and negotiated it in Beaver Falls.” 7
Justice Stevens thought this was beyond what Congress intended. At
the end of the day, my client won the case, but I did not succeed in persuading
Justice Stevens. This was the first, but not the last time that would be true.
In the ensuing twenty-eight Terms, I had the privilege of arguing before
Justice Stevens sixty-four more times before he retired from the Court. What
never ceased to amaze me was how unfailingly gracious he was. He routinely
apologized for interrupting arguing counsel, which, of course, was
unnecessary. We all know that the argument time is the Justices’ time, not
the lawyer’s. Still, his style was unique and endearing.
Two other facets of his style at oral argument were humility and wit. I
was in the courtroom the day when a lawyer referred to him as Judge Stevens
and then immediately apologized. Justice Stevens, obviously not as
concerned about the moniker as some members of the Court (the Clerk of
the Court tells arguing counsel not to refer to any of the Justices as “Judge”),
immediately reassured the flustered lawyer: “Well, your mistake in calling
me Judge is also made in Article III of the Constitution, by the way.” 8 Article
III, Section One specifically refers to “Judges” of the “supreme” Court.
What made Justice Stevens’s understated style of asking questions
particularly powerful was the contrast of that style with the questions’
content: His questions were often the hardest ones counsel would face during
the argument. One of my favorite memories of an exchange with Justice
Stevens was not in a case I argued. My then-partner and good friend, Rex
Lee, argued on behalf of the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) in a case against Jerry Tarkanian, the former head basketball coach
of the University of Nevada at Las Vegas (UNLV). 9
The issue in the case was whether the NCAA could be considered a
state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment,
because of its actions in connection with the suspension of Coach Tarkanian
by UNLV, which as a state university is a state actor. 10 Justice Stevens, who
I believe was the best hypothetical questioner on the Court (evidenced also
Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (holding that Congress did
not have power under the Commerce Clause to pass a law forbidding individuals from knowingly carrying
a gun in a school zone).
7 McElroy, 455 U.S. at 660 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
9 NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
10 Id. at 191–92.
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by his question in McElroy quoted above), asked Tarkanian’s counsel the
following:
Well, let me give you this example. Supposing United Airlines tells O’Hare
Airport in Chicago that we won’t land here anymore, because we think your
airport manager is doing a sloppy job of turning on the lights, or something like
that, at night. They just say, we won’t do it.
And O’Hare says,
well, we can’t operate without United, so we’ll fire him. Would United become
a state actor because they have enough economic power to insist on that kind of
result? 11

The transcript then reads: “The mere—if you—” and, if you listen to
the tape of the oral argument, there is a long silence, which is interrupted by
Justice Scalia interjecting: “You want to try to say no,” which is followed in
the transcript by “[Laughter].” 12 I remember often seeing lawyers standing at
the podium after Justice Stevens would ask a question like his “O’Hare”
hypothetical, and you could see from the expression on their faces that they
knew there was a trap in the hypothetical, but they often could not figure out
what would be worse, saying yes or saying no.
My favorite oral argument exchange between Justice Stevens and
arguing counsel occurred when I was not in the courtroom. In Grutter v.
Bollinger, which was the challenge to the constitutionality of the University
of Michigan Law School’s admissions process, 13 my law firm, Sidley Austin,
filed a brief on behalf of retired military officers. In that brief, we argued that
the United States military academies rely upon affirmative action in their
admissions in order to ensure a racially integrated officer corps, which is
critical to our national security. 14 We further contended that the admissions
process at Michigan’s law school was not materially different and that both
systems should be constitutional. 15
I need to make a disclaimer here. Although my name was at the top of
the brief, my partner, Virginia Seitz, took the laboring oar in preparing the
amicus brief, and for that reason she was listed as counsel of record. The
brief was the subject of some back and forth between Justice Ginsburg and
petitioner’s counsel early in the oral argument. 16 But the role of the brief
became much more important later in the oral argument (at least for me)
when the Solicitor General went to the podium to argue in support of
petitioner.
11
12
13
14
15
16

Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (No. 87-1061).
Id.
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Id. at 330–31.
See id.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 7–9, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
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After the first sentence of argument, Justice Stevens politely interrupted
as follows:
General Olson, just let me get a question out and you answer it at your
convenience. I’d like you to comment on Carter Phillips’ brief. What is your
view of the strength of that argument? 17

Two things are striking about this question. First, it reflects Justice
Stevens’s remarkable gentility, which I have already noted, in asking
questions— “answer it at your convenience.” It should not surprise anyone
that the Solicitor General responded immediately. Second, I was
unbelievably flattered to have the Justice use my name to identify the brief.
The recognition was undeserved, but the publicity was great. I have long
suspected that he did it because we are both Northwestern Law School
alums, but I could never work up the nerve to ask him that question.
Over the years, actually decades, I developed a very warm relationship
with Justice Stevens. He always nodded to me with a smile when he walked
onto the bench and, of course, he treated me with the same cordiality he
extended to all arguing counsel. I cannot say that my record with the Justice
reflected any special deference to my arguments. I lost his vote in thirty-four
of the sixty-five I cases I argued before him. And technically, I only argued
sixty-four times in his presence. On the day of one case I argued in the Court,
Washington, D.C. suffered a twenty-two-plus inch snow storm, and I had to
get a ride to One First Street with Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Justice
Stevens had even tougher transportation woes. His flight from Florida was
cancelled, and he missed the argument (along with Justice Souter), although
he no doubt read the transcript. He joined Justice Thomas’s opinion for a
unanimous Court in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Hiles. 18
I wish I could say that my last argument before Justice Stevens was one
for the ages but, sadly, it was not. I represented Alabama and other States,
along with an interstate Compact of States, in an original action against
North Carolina where my clients sued North Carolina for breach of the
Compact involving building a nuclear waste disposal site.19 The very last
question Justice Stevens asked was about how the money that would be
generated by the site (had it been built) would have been distributed among
the Compact’s members. 20 It was a straightforward question about the
mechanics of the Compact, which reflected another trait of many of Justice
17
18
19
20

Orig.).
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Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 338 (2010).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 81, Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330 (2010) (No. 132,
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Stevens’s questions: they dug into the nuts and bolts of the dispute in front
of the Court. He was just as interested in the minutiae as he was in the big
picture legal issues; he had a complete grasp of both aspects of a case. And,
he had amazing intellectual curiosity. Because of the breadth of his potential
concerns, I always prepared for arguments not only at the level of broad legal
principles, but also by getting into the weeds of the factual setting in a case,
knowing that Justice Stevens might ask a question as simple as, “How does
all of this work?”
Like everyone else, I had no idea that the Justice would announce his
retirement at the end of the 2009 Term. It was a sad day for me because I
knew I would miss his welcoming smile when he walked onto the bench, his
gracious way of asking questions, and even the minefield of his
hypotheticals, all of which made his role on the bench very special to me
personally. Others in this Symposium will focus on him as a boss and as a
brilliant jurist, but my strongest memories of the Justice came from his
unique and inspiring role during oral argument: He was both the gentlest and
the toughest questioner on the Court for thirty-five years.
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